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The Rights and Remedies of Financing
Creditors in Liquor Licenses
Philip Shuchman
The confusion engendered in liquor licensing by the exercise of state
police power provides the nucleus of Professor Shuchman's discussion of
the problems inherent in financing the purchase of a liquor license. Proceeding from the availability of judicialrelief, the author describes the entire spectrum of remedial procedures, including corporate organization
and limited partnershipagreements. Professor Shuchman concludes with
a significantanalysis of the priority problems arising between a federal tax
lien upon a liquor license and a financing creditor'ssecurity interest obtained in accordance with the Uniform Commercial Code.

I.

THE NATURE AND QUALITIES OF THE LIQUOR LICENSE

HE RETAIL liquor license might be termed the union card to a
fairly well closed shop; the license is not quite a Ph.D. or
admission to the Bar, but it does enable one to earn a living. Typically, the proprietor is a small businessman whose ownership interests in other taprooms are often
THE AUTHOR (B.A., Pennsylvania State
University, LL.B., M.A., University of

Pennsylvania) is currently a Visiting Associate Professor of Law at the University
of Indiana Law School, and his teaching
specialties include Jurisprudence, Credi-

tors' Rights, and Contracts.

restricted by law.'

His pur-

chase of the license for an
amount in excess of the statutory renewal fee -

virtually

all such licenses are renewable
annually certainly repre-

sents an investment of capital,
an investment which the licensee and those who finance his purchase wish to protect
' See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 41-312 (1963); MI. ANN. CODE art. 2B, § 41 (a)
(Supp. 1965).
The New Jersey statute allows retail liquor licensees to hold only two licenses. See
N.J. REV. STAT. § 33:1-12.31 (Supp. 1965), the validity of which was affirmed in
Grand Union Co. v. Sills, 43 N.J. 390, 204 A.2d 853 (1964). Missouri permits ownership of as many as three licenses by a single person. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 311.260 (1963).
Nebraska allows ownership of two licenses, NEB. REV. STAT. § 53-124.02 (Supp. 1965),
as do Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-4 8a (Supp. 1965), Wisconsin, Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 176.05 (3) (1961), and Massachusetts, under certain circumstances.
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 138, § 15 (1965).
However, the administrative agencies of some states limit the number of licenses
held by one person, although the statutes or regulations have no such provision.
2 The investment cannot be protected by an insurance policy against the revocation
of the liquor license even for reasons not due to intentional acts of the licensee and his
family and excluding actions by an employee acting with the knowledge and consent of
the licensee. Such an insurance policy was deemed invalid as contrary to public policy
by the attorney general of California. 21 OPS. ATT'Y GEN. No. 17, at 8094 (Cal. 1958).
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Apart from the legal complexities of acquiring a retail liquor license,' the purchase price may be considerable, ranging from a few
thousand dollars for the bare "ticket" without a location or accompanying business, to investments in six figures for a well-equipped
business in a good neighborhood.' Ordinarily, the license in a particular location accounts for most of the value of the business enterprise. And, notwithstanding contractual recitations to the contrary,
the fixtures, equipment, and inventory are rarely significant items in
the total purchase price.
Although other security for the financing of the liquor license
purchase may be available, the license itself usually constitutes a major item of security to the lender, one without which the loan is inadequately secured. What can a person financing the purchase of a
retail liquor license do to secure and protect his investment?
There are different considerations confronting ordinary contract
or judgment creditors and those whose claims originate from transactions in which the liquor license is all or part of the security
sought. Those in the latter group seek, at the time of the loan or
other financing transaction, to put themselves in the position of a
secured creditor with rights as a lienor, arising at that time, good
as against his debtor and subsequent creditors. Where for one reason or another the lien as such cannot be created, the financer will
seek to be in the best possible position obtainable as an ordinary contract or judgment creditor. For the most part, these comments are
directed to the financer, and at two points in time: when the transaction takes place and when the debtor-licensee is in default. As to
the latter situation, a brief statement is presented of the respective
rights of the financing creditor and third parties as creditors or as
claimants to the liquor license. Most of the references which follow
are to so-called "on-sale" licenses, those which permit drinks to be
sold for consumption on the licensed premises.'
8 The nonlegal difficulties of acquiring a license can also be overwhelming. See
N.Y. Times, June 16, 1966, p. 1, col. 5 for the conclusion of the Playboy Club's efforts
at procuring a liquor license in New York for $100,000.

The former Republican state

chairman was convicted of the bribery of the former chairman of the New York State
Liquor Authority.

4 The economics of the retail liquor business have been well discussed lately. See
Barron, Business and ProfessionalLicensing - California,a Representative Example, 18
STAN. L. REv. 640 (1966); Levin, Economic and Regulatory Aspects of Liquor Licensing, 112 U. PA. L REV. 785 (1964). For a less academic but fully accurate and informative statement see Metz, How To Run a New Bar on Chic East Side, N.Y. Times,

Nov. 12, 1966, p. 37, col. 4.
5 see Jo NT Comm. oF THE STATES To STUDY ALCOHOLIC BEvERAGE LAWS, AL-

COHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL table 11, at 98-99 (2d rev. ed. 1960) [hereinafter
cited as ABC] for a listing of states permitting such sales by licensees.
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II. THE PROBLEMS OF THE FINANCER:
EFFECTS OF PUBLIC POLICY

The financing creditor must overcome both theoretical and statutory objections to his acquisition of a secured interest in his debtor's
liquor license. He is confronted with statements of public policy
which can result in consequences neither foreseen nor anticipated by
any of the parties to the financing transaction.
As an example, a distinction has been made, either by statute or
judicial decision, between the privilege of earning one's livelihood in
a business or occupation regulated by the state and the right to do
so; from this distinction courts have then questioned whether, if a
business or occupation is a privilege, there is any property right
conferred upon the person lawfully exercising that privilege.
A.

Licensee

When the conduct of a licensed business or occupation is termed
a right, the licensee gets considerable protection from arbitrary action by the state or its licensing agency. His gainful but regulated
employment is said to constitute a property right of which he cannot be easily deprived. Persons holding such rights are entitled to
all that due process has come to mean, including notice, specification
of charges, full hearing, and the right to judicial review.6 But,
above all, there must exist some rational connection between the effort to prevent the holder from exercising his right and the nature of
the right itself.7
However, when the victim is engaged in a lawful business or occupation termed a privilege by statute or judicial opinion, he has no
property rights in his means of livelihood, and his activity is said to
be subject to any degree of interference by the state, including the
possibility of having the business legislated out of existence.'
Consequences of a very different nature attend the appellations,
and although the question has been asked before, it seems appro6 See, e.g., City of Miami v. South Miami Coach Lines, Inc., 59 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 1952)
(bus line franchise); Parker v. Board of Barber Examiners, 84 So. 2d 80 (La. Ct. App.
1955) (license to operate barber college); Hecht v. Monaghan, 307 N.Y. 461, 121 N.E.
2d 421 (1954) (license to operate taxicab). See generally 1 DAvis, AD iNiSTRATVE
LAW TREATISE § 7.19 (1958), from which these examples are taken.
7
See Melody Music, Inc. v. FCC, 345 F.2d 730 (D.C. Cir. 1965). But see Barsky v.
Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 422 (1954).
8 See, e.g., Nampa Lodge 1389 v. Smylie, 71 Idaho 212, 215-16, 229 P.2d 991, 993
(1951); Grand Union Co. v. Sills, 43 NJ. 390, 398, 204 A.2d 853, 857 (1964); Bungalow Amusement Co. v. City of Seattle, 148 Wash. 485,491, 269 Pac. 1043, 1045 (1928).
See generally Annot., 60 A.L.R. 173 (1928).
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priate to inquire first into the names themselves, on the assumption
that if we speak of something, it exists; if it does not, let us engender
it, so that the class of things described by these names will not be
empty. One can define these words by working backwards. If the
activity is one which the state can entirely eliminate, it is a privilege.
If the activity is not subject to such abridgment, but may still be regulated, it is a right.
Liquor licenses are consistently privileges,9 but beauticians' licenses are rights."° And being a lawyer is a right," or at least not a
matter of grace,'" but lobster fishing is a privilege. 3 Drivers' licenses are both rights' 4 and privileges.'5 But insofar as the labels
may be used to prevent persons from conducting licensed businesses' 6 or engaging in licensed occupations 7 or to prohibit mere
activities such as driving a motor vehicle,'" there is a growing tendency to ignore such distinctions.
Although liquor licenses are privileges and not rights, the results
of that choice are significant; therefore, why should this manner of
earning a living be so easily eradicable, while other occupations
which are also deemed to be privileges are not in any such danger?
The usual answers given are that businesses involving the sale of
liquor are privileges which any state could outlaw and that such
business activities are separately categorized because they are at best
of no advantage to the community and may actually be injurious to
9
See, e.g., Nampa Lodge 1389 v. Smylie, 71 Idaho 212, 229 P.2d 991 (1951); Michael v. Town of Logan, 247 Iowa 574, 73 N.W.2d 714 (1955); Morse v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 319 Mich. 52, 29 N.W.2d 316 (1947).
10 Gilchrist v. Bierring, 234 Iowa 899, 14 N.W.2d 724 (1944), which provides a
valuable discussion of the distinction between various licensed businesses and occupations.
" Ex pfarte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 379 (1867).
' 2 Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 n.5 (1957).
13 State v. Cote, 122 Me. 450, 120 Ad. 538 (1923).

14 Ratliff v. Lampton, 32 Cal. 2d 226, 195 P.2d, 792 (1948); Wignall v. Fletcher,
See generally Annot., 10 A.L.R.2d 833
303 N.Y. 435, 103 N.E.2d 728 (1952).

(1948).
1 Commonwealth v. Cronin, 336 Pa. 469, 9 A.2d 408 (1939); Nulter v. State
Rd. Comm'n, 119 W. Va. 312, 193 S.E. 549 (1937).
16
Miskell v. Termplan, Inc., 381 S.W.2d 129, 133 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964) (rejecting
the attorney general's analogy of small loan licenses to liquor licenses in the sense that
they are both privileges).
17
Bennett v. Arizona State Bd. of Pub. Welfare, 95 Ariz. 170, 388 P.2d 166 (1963)
(license to operate day nursery).
18 See State v. Moseng, 254 Minn. 263, 270-71, 95 N.W.2d 6, 12-13 (1959), with
dictum to the effect that whether a driver's license is a "right" or a "privilege" is unimportant, since it is of "substantial value" to the holder and should not be revoked arbitrarily. Ibid.

WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18: 414

the citizenry. These answers draw lines which obviously vary
greatly from state to state and from one time to another. 9
What conclusion follows from the state's policy that it could, if
it wished, completely destroy the privilege? It is that the lawful
business confers no property interest, because if it were a property interest it could not be so blithely destroyed. The doctrine has still
another logical corollary: no one but the state can destroy the lawful
business of the liquor licensee; hence, as regards much of the world,
the license does, at least occasionally, confer property rights.2"
Most regulatory statutes explicitly admonish liquor licensees and
the world that does business with them that the license which they
hold and from which they earn their livelihood is not property and
confers no property rights.2 ' The holder is told that he has a purely
personal privilege to conduct a certain kind of business and that it
is revocable at the discretion of the state by its licensing agency, although usually in conformity with the statutory requirements or the
administrative rules and regulations.22 The reported decisions in
most states, no matter what they actually decide, usually contain a
preamble consistent with this peculiar policy. The consequences of
these statutory declarations are that for purposes of regulating by police powers the conduct of such businesses, the licensees cannot effectively, although they often attempt to do so, interpose any constitutional objections to the deprivation of their property without due
process. Notwithstanding that most of the statutes incorporate to
some extent the right to administrative hearings and often to judicial
review as well,2" the various statutes certainly manifest a desire to
19 See generally Comment, Occupational License Revocation, 31 U. CM. L. REV.
577 (1964).
20 See Weller v. Hopper, 85 Idaho 386, 379 P.2d 792 (1963). Although as between
the state and the licensee, the license is only a privilege, "as between the licensee and
third persons [it] constitutes a right to which value as property and assignability is attributed.
" 14.
Id. at 394, 379 P.2d at 797.
21 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-14 (1960); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 23-514
(1948); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, § 119 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1965); KAN. STAT. ANN.
S 41-326 (1964); MASS. GEM. LAws ANN. ch. 138, § 23 (1965); NEB. REV. STAT. §
53-149 (1960); N.J. REv. STAT. § 33:1-26 (Supp. 1965); OKLA. STAT. ANN. it. 37,§
532 (Supp. 1965); ORE. REv. STAT. §5 471.301(1)(a), (f) (1963); TEX. PEN. CODE
ANN. art. 666-13 (1952). The 1960 Study of the Joint Committee of the States to Study
Alcoholic Beverage Laws, Alcoholic Beverage Control, is in agreement and recommends
that liquor licenses be held as privileges, asserting that "any statute which undertakes to
create a property right in the terms of such license is inimical to and destructive of the
public interest." ABC 66 (2d rev. ed. 1960).
22 Usually, of course, these admonitions apply only insofar as the licensees might
have better rights as against state action in revocation proceedings or in refusals to permit transfer or renewal.
28 See ABC table 10, at 91-97.
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deprive licensees of the constitutional rights which would otherwise
be theirs if the license were taken to evidence a property right.
It is not too late to question what superior interest is served by
trying to deny liquor licensees the usual constitutional protections
granted other licensed businesses, occupations, and activities. Such
statutes and judicial practices may be expedient, but they are inconsistent with reality and productive of a hodgepodge of fictions. And
worse yet, they pose the question of why any state should prefer to
deprive a small businessman of what might otherwise be his constitutional rights.
However, judges and legislators are aware that liquor licenses,
with or without the tangible personal property which accompanies
them, are bought and sold, bequeathed and financed, valued in a
fairly flexible market place with brokers specializing in their purchase and sale, and are often the major economic asset of the small
businessmen who own and operate package stores and taverns.
Hence it is that the distinction arrived at in theory - that as against
the state only, but not as against much of the world, is the license not
property - is sometimes utilized in practice. But just as frequently
are the property and non-property concepts confused and yet another good theory lost because of contrary facts.
So it has come to be the general rule, notwithstanding any possible confusion in application, that as between the state and the licensee, the liquor license is simply a personal, revocable privilege
conferring no property, property right, or property interest upon the
holder. 4 And that blanket, unlimited authority seems also to comprehend the commercial transactions of licensees whether or not the
business in question or the particular bargain bears any relation to
the purposes of regulation.'Yet the courts of many states, in a variety of situations, have
recognized that this right to do business is not so easily taken from
the licensee, notwithstanding that the license is a privilege. In fact,
the states and the administrative agencies have been warned that
they must treat the license as though itwere a property right,2 6 and
24 See Note, 40 NOTRE DAME LAw. 203 (1965).
25 See Pacific Firestone Escrow Co. v. Food Giant Mkts., Inc., 202 Cal. App. 2d
155, 20 Cal. Rptr. 570 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962). "The state in the exercise of its police

power properly may regulate the manner in which creditors of the licensee may seek
some protection in the collection of their debts from the proceeds of the sale of a li-

cense."
2

Id. at 158, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 572.

6 People v. Stein, 236 N.Y.S2d 703 (Westchester County Ct. 1962) (the lawful

possession of a liquor license invests the holder with a property right); Lewis v. City of
Grand Rapids, 222 F. Supp. 349 (W.D. Mich. 1963), i-etd, 356 F.2d 276 (6th Cit.
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in some cases they have been compelled to provide greater protection to licensees"7 and other interested parties."8 In addition, many
of the regulatory statutes provide a fully adequate measure of protection for licensees against questionable fact-finding by administrative agencies as a part of the adjudicative process when penalties
of suspension, revocation, or refusal to transfer or renew are possible
results. And even the statutes can be questioned to determine
whether there is a tenable relationship between the regulations imposed and the social purpose of the legislative body. 9
B.

Financers

The theoretical state privilege of the licensee has been qualified
by statute and judicial decision, but as regards the interests of financers who most often are or could be secured creditors, there is far
less recognition that the privilege of holding a license is property or
a property right. That fact creates most of the problems.
(1) Prohibition Against Tied Houses.-Prior to Prohibition,
the financial relations between manufacturers and distributors and
the retail outlets had been so intimate that the latter were often
termed "tied houses" both in the United States and in England.
Most state statutes enacted immediately after the repeal of the eighteenth amendment" expressly forbade any financial interest in retail
outlets by manufacturers and wholesalers.3 " The system may have
been advantageous both to the brewers and wholesale outlets as well
as to the saloonkeepers, with no public interest injured thereby."2
1965 ) : "To deny the transfer [requested] without due process, on the ground that it is a
privilege only, and not property ... is to dose the eyes of justice to realities .... " Id.
at 385. Midwest Beverage Co. v. Gates, 61 F. Supp. 688 (N.D. Ind. 1945): "IT]he
use of the permit, once granted, has the elements of property irrespective of what the
Legislature may declare about the permit itself, and except for the omnipresent and unlimited power of the state to revoke or modify the terms of the permit in the interest of
the public welfare, the use of such permit, if not the permit itself, is property within
the meaning of the due process clause of the Federal Constitution." Id. at 691.
27
Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964) "Merely calling a liquor license
a privilege does not free the municipal authorities from the due process requirements
and allow them to exercise an uncontrolled discretion." Id. at 609.
28 In Keating v. State, 173 So. 2d 673 (Fla. 1965), a mandamus action brought by
the landlord of padlocked, but formerly licensed premises was permitted.
29 See Reynolds v. Louisiana Bd. of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 248 La. 639, 181
So. 2d 377 (1965).
30 The repeal was effectuated in 1933 by U.S. CONSr. amend. XXI, § 1.
3l The ABC Study indicates that thirty-four states prohibit "tied houses" by statute.
ABC 35 & table 17, at 107. See the recent discussions in Grand Union Co. v. Sills, 43
N.J. 390, 407, 204 A.2d 853, 862 (1964) and Pickerill v. chott, 55 So. 2d 716 (Fla.
195 1), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 815 (1952).
32 Friedrich, Liquor Industry, in 9 ENcyc. Soc. Sci. 495, 499-500 (1933).
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The purpose of the statutes is clear,33 although in many states there
is a fairly consistent pattern of evasion. For example, loans are
granted to retail licensees by financers not within the prohibited
class,"4 and these loans are, in some informal or sub rosa manner,
guaranteed by parties forbidden to have any financial interest in or
dealings with retail outlets. 5
(2) Rationale and Effect of the Prohibition.-Generally,public policy is opposed to the existence of any undisclosed financial
interests in retail licenses.3 6 It is felt that persons not subject to
preliminary examination and approval and to the continuing scrutiny of the administrative agency should not be permitted to exercise
any control by ownership or lesser financial interests over the operation of the licensed business.
The general mandate of full disclosure has been variously applied to undisclosed mortgagees, 7 ownership by corporations, 8 secret principals," and lesser interests as forms of ownership.40 Usually record ownership as shown on the renewal applications will be
conclusive on the question of ownership of the license.4' These decisions do seem to implement the public policy of full disclosure
and the resultant proper imposition of responsibilities. But many
33

See generally Annot., 136 A.LR. 1238 (1942).

34 See Northcutt v. McKibben, 236 Mo. App. 605, 159 S.W.2d 699 (1942); Cen-

tral Trust Co. v. Mann's Restaurants, Inc., 166 Misc. 381, 2 N.Y.S.2d 447 (Sup. Ct.),
aff'd, 254 App. Div. 823, 6 N.Y.S.2d 151 (1938); Atlas Inv. Co. v. Christ, 240 Wis.
114, 2 N.W.2d 784 (1942).
3
5 The writer has personal knowledge of many such arrangements.
86 It is said that this policy arises from the desire to prevent undisclosed persons
from having secret ownership or from otherwise exercising control over liquor licenses.
Leshem v. Leshem, 31 Del. Ch. 37, 63 A.2d 673 (Ch. 1949); Smith v. Nix, 206 Ga.
403, 57 S.E.2d 275 (1950); Price v. Marcus, 199 Old. 356, 185 P.2d 953 (1947) (and
cases cited therein). To implement this policy, credit transactions where the license
is made security for the debt are sometimes either absolutely forbidden or rendered
unenforceable by statute. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 24076; Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 243.660 (1963). If the foregoing causal relation seems to be a nov sequitur, it is.
37 Scranton v. Whitlock, 389 P.2d 1015 (Wyo. 1964).
38 Cf. Myerson v. Myerson, 88 Ariz. 385, 387, 357 P.2d 133, 134 (1960). Arizona
requires corporate licenses to be held by individually qualified agents of the corporation.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4-202 (Supp. 1966).
39
isenman v. Seitz, 26 Del. Ch. 185, 25 A.2d 496 (Ch. 1942). See Clark v. Tinnin, 81 Ariz. 259, 263, 304 P.2d 947, 949-50 (1956); Romano v. Bono, 168 Misc. 897,
6 N.Y.S.2d 204 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
40
Kalastro v. Duncan, 90 Ariz. 122, 366 P.2d 684 (1961). Cf. Kendzie v. O'Connell, 283 App. Div. 256, 127 N.Y.S.2d 380 (1954) (part of purchase price could have
come from unknown objectionable sources).
4
1 Myerson v. Myerson, 88 Ariz. 385, 357 P.2d 133 (1960); Romano v. Bono, 16&
Misc. 897, 6 N.Y.S.2d 204 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
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states permit corporate ownership and do not seem to encounter
any major problems in imposing the same requirements upon the
officers and shareholders of the corporate licensees that they would
upon an individual or partnership.42 More revealing perhaps is that
corporations with publicly traded stock are sometimes exempted
from the requirements imposed upon close corporations, 3 a situation
which is some indication that the statutes are statements of a fictitious public policy.
Thus it is that the statutes which were designed to permit the unimpeded application of the police powers of the states and to prevent the control of retail licensees by manufacturers and brewers and
persons unqualified to hold licenses have resulted in the liquor license often not being property for entirely unrelated purposes44 and
have thereby unnecessarily prejudiced the rights of financers and
creditors of licensees.
III.

STANDARD REMEDIES THROUGH JUDICIAL PROCESS

Setting aside the idea that what is strong and earnest public policy in one state may be thought insignificant in another, the financer
must prevent the transfer of the license unless the proceeds are to be
applied to the loan balance,45 and he must do his best to prevent
others from acquiring interests which may have priority over his
debt. But above all, if the license is to be good security, the financer must have some means of compelling the sale of the license
42 See ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 4-202(C) (Supp. 1966); D.C. CODE ANN. § 25115(a)1 (1961); HAwAII REv. LAws § 159-52(a) (Supp. 1962); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
43, § 120 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1965); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 243.100(4) (1963);
McHsI.STAT. ANN. § 18.994 (Supp. 1965); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 178:10 (1964);
N.J. STAT. ANN. S 33:1-25 (Supp. 1965); N.Y. ALco. BEV. CONTROL LAW § 110.2;
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47 § 4-403(c) (Supp.1952); TEX.PEN. CODE ANN. art. 666-18
(1952); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 176.05(13) (1957); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 12-9 (Supp.
1965).
43
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §5 23405, 24070; MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 138, 5
23 (Supp. 1966).
44 Some states even make the liquor license a special article of commerce and require
that all creditors be paid in full as a condition of state approval of a requested transfer.
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE S 24074; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 46-5-15.2.B (Supp. 1965); .I1.
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 3-5-19 (Supp. 1965). It is unclear what rational connection such
a policy has with the state's police powers, the basis for dose and purposive regulation of
the retail liquor business.
45
This can sometimes be accomplished in the lease or agreement for sale of the
building approved for the license. See Fong v. Rossi, 87 Cal. App. 2d 20, 195 P.2d 854
(Dist. Ct. App. 1948); Prey v. Nakles, 380 Pa. 616, 112 A.2d 329 (1955).
The
license may be tied to a given location by contractual stipulation, or its transfer may be
prohibited by contract. Greve v. Leger, Ltd., 42 Cal. Rptr. 464 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965)
(as part of sale of license by owners of real estate).
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so that the proceeds of the forced sale may be used to satisfy his obligation. The means of creating the maximum number of remedies
for the creditor will vary by state, and the states may be conveniently
grouped for analytical purposes.
Minority Procedures

A.

A small number of states accept a liquor license as being property subject to execution process by the conventional devices: issuance of a writ of execution; levy, seizure, or both; and judicial sale.
Usually these execution statutes are broadly drawn so that the definition of property upon which execution may be had is taken to indude liquor licenses.40 But even absent such statutes the courts
view the creditors' problems realistically and will not deny the value
of the license as an object of execution to satisfy a judgment.4
The liquor license may be subject to landlords' liens4 8 and to the
liens created by chattel mortgages.4 9 In those states which are now
under the Uniform Commercial Code, the liquor license, classified
as a general intangible," can presumably be the subject of a security
interest.
In all these states the purchaser of the license at a judicial sale
must meet the statutory requirements for holding a liquor license
and must be approved by the state administrative agency as a transferee. He must qualify as a licensee in the same manner as one
who is proposed by the transferor in a voluntary assignment. And
all the states here considered do permit voluntary assignment of
liquor licenses. 1 The question which naturally arises is what public
interest suffers when the transfer is by operation of law instead.
4

0
See D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-326 (1961); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 93-4306
(1964).
47

See Duncan v. Truman, 74 Ariz. 328, 248 P.2d 879 (1952); Nelson v. Naranjo,

74 N.M. 502, 395 P.2d 228 (1964).
48

Yarbrough v. Villeneuve, 160 So. 2d 747 (Fla. 1964).
See, e.g., Hubbard v. Jebb, 163 So. 2d 307 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964); Schieche v.
Pasco, 88 Idaho 36, 395 P.2d 671 (1964); Focas v. Lampe, 4 CCH INST. CREDIT
GUmE 5 99156 (Md. Cir. Ct. 1963); Commercial Acceptance Corp. v. Benvenuti,
341 Mich. 100, 67 N.W.2d 129 (1954) (ordering specific performance to implement
the terms of the chattel mortgage); Nicolini v. Langermann, 104 S.W. 501 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1907). Roodvoets v. Anscer, 308 Mich. 360, 13 N.W.2d 850 (1944) held that a
chattel mortgage for a term beyond the expiration of the liquor license necessarily refers
to the renewals of the license. But cf. Niles v. Mathusa, 162 N.Y. 546, 57 N.E. 184 (Ct
App. 1900) holding a liquor tax certificate (the then license) not to be a chattel within
the meaning of the chattel mortgage act.
5
0 UNiFOF COmMfERCIAL CODE § 9-106 [hereinafter cited as UCCI.
51
New Mexico also permits liquor licenses to be leased, with the usual qualification
that the state must approve the lease agreement and the lessee. See Valley Country Club
v. Mender, 64 N.M. 59, 323 P.2d 1099 (1958).
49
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Majority Procedures

Since the new licensee is subject to the same investigation and
requirements in both types of transfer, voluntary or by operation of
law, the state is fully protected in either instance. But most of the
statutes expressly prohibit any execution process against the liquor
license.5 2 The reasons seem to be twofold: the fear that if the license is subject to foreclosure on a judgment, the creditor will exercise a measure of control over the conduct of the licensed business;
and the fear that the financing creditor who has not been approved
by the regulatory agency,53 may cause the licensee to do unlawful
acts. Or perhaps it may be thought that merely the economic
duress of owing money will cause the licensee to conduct his business
unlawfully. In fact, quite the contrary is a far more accurate description of the creditor's interests and abilities. The financing
creditor is aware that for violation of the statute or regulations the
liquor license may be revoked and the most valuable item of his security lost entirely. Hence, the creditor is very much concerned
with the proper operation of the licensed business. Also, it is simply
not an accurate description of the creditor-debtor relationship at
such a level when it is said that the creditor can exercise any significant measure of control over his debtor's conduct of the licensed
business. It is usually all the creditor can do to make sure that the
licensee's rent and taxes are paid in order to reduce the likelihood of
there being superior competing creditors and lienors.
Another reason, discussed earlier,54 for the prohibitive statutes
and some of the interpretative cases arises from the confusion regarding the status of the liquor license as property where the police
powers of the state are involved and its status as property as between
the licensee and those with whom he does business."
It is noteworthy that most of the statutes which either prohibit
pledges of liquor licenses as security or make them immune to execution process for the reasons stated, specifically provide for the tem52
See ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 4-204 (A) (1956); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 3014 (1960); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 23-514 (1948); ILL. ANN.STAT. ch. 43, § 119
(Smith-Hurd 1944); IOWA CODE ANN. § 123-29 (1958); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 41-326
(1963); MD.ANN. CODE art. 2B, § 56 (15) (Supp. 1965); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 138,
§ 23 (1965); NEB. REV. STAT. § 53-149 (1960); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 33:1-26 (Supp.
1965); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 37, § 532 (Supp. 1966); ORE. REv. STAT. § 471.301
(1) (h) (1963); TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 666-13(b) (1952).
53
By administrative regulation, the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board must give
prior approval to any person lending money to a liquor licensee.
54 See text accompanying notes 6-29 supra.
55 See statutes listed note 21 supra.
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porary operation and subsequent sale of the license by personal representatives of decedents' estates and by receivers and trustees,
whether appointed by the state courts or by bankruptcy courts."o At
least receivers and trustees are certainly acting on behalf of creditors, about whom the state licensing agency may know nothing.
Notwithstanding the court appointment or approval of the particular person, receivers and trustees as well as personal representatives
would not necessarily have been approved by the state licensing
agency as transferees, nor do they have to be so approved. But the
public interests involved have not seemed to suffer by that lack.
IV. ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF RELIEF
A.

Generally

The judgment creditor who cannot have direct execution against
the liquor license (which includes the lender who could not or did
not get a security interest57 or other lien on the license) must seek
other means of execution process. He is very likely limited to creditors' bills or execution proceedings supplemental to his judgment
where such procedure is available. In many states special statutory
provision is made for receivers,"8 but even without such authority,
the court of execution can secure the debtor-licensee's signature on
the transfer application forms by an order entered after the court
has acquired in personam jurisdiction over the holder or other person who must sign. If the actual signature cannot be had, the court
can order that as done which should have been done,59 a common
practice in actions for specific performance" and in other equity
proceedings.6" Although these procedures are contingent upon ap56 See text accompanying notes 103-21 infra.

57 See text accompanying notes 163-75 infra.
58 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4-204 (1956); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 23102;
HAwAII REv. LAws § 159-94 (Supp. 1961); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, § 119 (SmithHurd 1944); IND. ANN. STAT. § 12-502 (1956); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, §
203.2 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 2B, § 74(a) (Supp. 1965); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch.
138, § 23 (1932); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 311.030 (1959); NEB. REV. STAT. § 53-150
(1960); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 33:1-26 (Supp. 1965); N.Y. ALcO. BEv. CONTROL LAW §
122; TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 666-13(b) (1952); VA.CODE ANN. § 4-59 (1964).
59 Campbell v. Bauer, 104 Cal. App. 2d 740, 232 P.2d 590 (Dist. Ct. App. 1951).
0 Cf. Jubinville v. Jubinville, 313 Mass. 103, 46 N.E.2d 533 (1943) (license holder
forced to cancel license which blocked sale of estate); Barr v. United States, 337 F.2d
693 (6th Cir. 1964) (recission of agreement of sale and retransfer of liquor license had
been ordered by the state court due to fraud in the transaction).
01
Saso v. Furtado, 104 Cal. App. 2d 759, 232 P.2d 583 (Dist. Ct. App. 1951)
which is contrary to a number of decisions illustrated by Mencsik v. Mencsik, 118 N.E.2d
182 (Ohio Ct App. 1952). But the Ohio courts have permitted receivers to take
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proval of the proposed transferee by the licensing agency, even that
can probably be dispensed with by appropriate court order directing
the licensing agency to act as transferor and accept as transferee that
person so designated by the court."
B.

Ancillary Suit

Even assuming a statute which either labels the liquor license
not property subject to execution process63 or one which, like the
California and Kentucky statutes,64 prohibits the pledging of liquor
licenses, the judgment creditor still has the following remedies
against the general property of the licensee: creditors' bills or execation proceedings supplemental to his judgment. They may not
alone satisfy the lender, for problems of actual security and priority
arise. But if coupled with a lien or security interest in the proceeds
of sale, supplemental proceedings and creditors' bills will at least
invoke execution process, and thus they are a satisfactory if cumbersome device for the lender. As against the debtor-licensee alone,
the mere institution of such process may bring about the payment of
the amount due. As against the rest of the competing world, such
proceedings will at least usually establish the priority of the creditor's equitable lien as of either the date of the action's commencement or the date of service of process.65 Since other private creditors and the federal government can do no better in such states, the
institution of the ancillary suit is probably worthwhile. However,
the execution creditor runs the risk of precipitating a petition in
bankruptcy, as against which the equitable lien usually has not had
time enough to season so as to avoid or override the rights of the
trustee under section 70a of the National Bankruptcy Act.66
possession and sell the businesses including the liquor license. See Little Shirley's, Inc.
v. Board of Liquor Control, 120 Ohio App. 179, 201 N.E.2d 718 (1964); Rio Bar,
Inc. v. State, 117 N.E.2d 522 (Ohio C.P. 1952).
62 Duncan v. Truman, 74 Ariz. 328, 248 P.2d 879 (1952) (by implication); Rigs v.
Sokel, 318 Mass. 337, 61 N.E.2d 538 (19,45) (by analogy); cf. Saso v. Furtado, supra
note 61.
63 See authorities cited note 52 supra.
64

CAL. Bus. & PROF. COm § 24076; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 243.660 (1963).

65

Metcalf v. Barker, 187 U.S. 165 (1902); United States v. Ruby Luggage Corp.,
142 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (by implication); In re Miller, 40 F. Supp. 482
(E.D.N.Y. 1941). See Glenn, Creditors' Rights - A Review of Recent Developments,

32 VA. L. REv. 235,240 (1946); Annot., 153 A.L.R. 211 (1944).
66 30 Stat. 566 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1964).
Knitting & Under-Garment Co., 182 F.2d 740 (2d Cit. 1950).

See In re Airmont

1967]

FINANCING LIQUOR LICENSES

C. Creditor's Bill
Traffic in liquor licenses appears now to exhibit about the same
artificial impediments and obstacles to commerce which attended
the common law restrictions on the issuance of writs of fieri facias"7
against choses in action. As late as the eighteenth century the chose
in action was taken to be a personal, non-assignable right, not a
tangible thing which admitted of levy on a writ of fieri facias and
physical seizure. s

There were grants made and licenses issued by the English monarchs for the production of soap and saltpetre6 9 and for the importation of playing cards.7" A monopoly was given to the Vintners to
sell wine and another given for the licensing of taverns.71 These
grantees and licensees often sold their privileges at high prices until
virtually the entire practice was abolished because too many of the
necessities of life came into the hands of the "patentees," who
charged excessively high prices for manufacture or sale as the case
might be.72 But, like present day liquor licensees, although the
grants, licenses, and monopolies were bought and sold, they were
7
not subject to execution by the writ of a judgment creditor.

3

How-

ever, they do appear to have been considered property which would
go to the assignees in bankruptcy of the holder.7 4
Judgment creditors in such cases secured the remedies they
sought in the courts of chancery. Viewing these intangibles as
equitable assets, chancery courts ordered the debtor to transfer the
asset to his judgment creditor, the plaintiff in the equity action, or
to a receiver appointed for that purpose. The asset was then valued
or sold and the judgment satisfied from the proceeds. Of course,
this is a description of creditors' bills which came to be applied to
virtually all assets of value which the debtor had and upon which
the judgment creditor could not make levy and have execution sale
67 "In practice, a writ of execution commanding the sheriff to levy and make the
amount of a judgment from the goods and chattels of the judgment debtor." BLACK,
LAw DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951).
68 7 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 541 (1925). Holdsworth's illustration makes it dear that even the document evidencing the chose in action could not be
the subject of larceny.
69 See Hulme, The History of the Patent System Under the Prerogativeand at Com-

mon Law, 12 L.Q. REv. 141, 145 (1896).
70 4 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra note 68, at 349.

71Id. at 347.
72
Ladas, Patents, in 12 ENCc. Soc. ScI. 19 (1934).
73 7 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra note 68, at 543.
74 Ibid.
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at law.7 5 In these proceedings the asset's value was then and is now
a function of its transferability. If the debtor can sell it for money,
then his creditors should be able to reach that value by creditors'
bills76 or by proceedings supplemental to the judgment which are
intended as statutory substitutes for creditors' bills." It is not only
the historical basis for the creditor's bill which supports its use with
liquor licenses, but a court assuming jurisdiction in equity will not
ordinarily appoint a receiver to do what the judgment creditor could
do himself. Hence, if execution at law can be had upon the liquor
license there is usually no relief available in equity.78 It does not
usually matter - nor should it at all - that approval of both the
sale and the buyer by the state licensing agency is required,79 for
many cases have held that despite the state restrictions, the liquor license is a valuable intangible asset which can be made available to
creditors by means of the appointment of a receiver at the instance
of a creditor.8" In other states nothing is said of the value of the
license, but the appointment of a receiver for execution process is
accepted practice. 8 '
V.

A.

ORGANIZATIONAL RELIEF

Partnershipsas Liquor Licensees
8
Most states permit liquor licenses to be held by partnerships.

75 See 1 GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES § 26 (1940). In
Ex parte Butler, 1 Atk. 210, 26 Eng. Rep. 136 (Ch. 1749), the assignees in bankruptcy
sold the bankrupt's governmental office as under-marshal of the city of London, for
which the bankrupt had paid £900, although the office could not have been subjected to
execution sale by writ of fieri favias and levy.
76 See Glenn, supra note 65, at 279.
77 Importers' & Traders' Nat'l Bank v. Quackenbush, 143 N.Y. 567, 38 N.E. 728
(1894).
78 Clark, Receivers at the Instance of Judgment Creditors and Priorities Incident
Thereto, 17 VA. L. REV. 45, 46 (1930).
79 In bankruptcy proceedings, the failure to complete the transfer, if due to no fault
of the buyer, entitles him to the return of his money. Cf. In re Comer & Co., 171 Fed.
261 (ED. Pa. 1909); Snyder v. Bougher, 214 Pa. 453, 63 At. 893 (1906).
80 See, e.g., Mollis v. Jiffy-Stitcher Co., 125 Cal. App. 2d 236, 270 P.2d 25 (Dist.
Ct.App. 1954); Wolf v. Barstow, 38 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 1949) (by analogy); Rosenberg
v. Borough Cordial Shop, Inc., 85 N.J. Super. 294, 204 A.2d 607 (Super. Ct. 1964).
Cf. United States v. Blackert, 220 F.2d 21 (9th Cir. 1955).
81
Kuczek v. Kuczek, 190 Misc. 1005, 76 N.Y.S.2d (Sup. Ct. 1947); Allied Inv.
Credit Corp. v. Stardust Lounge, Inc., 192 N.E.2d 801 (Ohio C.P. 1963). Cf. Leney &
Sons, Ltd. v. Callingham & Thompson, 1 K.B. 79 (1907).
82

.ALA. CODE tit. 29, § 1(a) (1958); ALASKA STAT. § 35-4-14 (1962); CAL. Bus. &

PROF. CODE 5 23008; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 75-2-4 (21) (1963); CONN. GEN.
4, § 101 (1953); D.C. CODE
STAT. ANN. § 30-1 (13) (1960); DEL. CODE ANN.tit.
ANN. § 25-103(m) (1961); HAWAII REV.LAWS § 159-1 (Supp. 1961); IDAHO CODE
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And, as a result, a common device used by financing creditors is the
creation of a limited partnership to hold the license, the loan made
by the financer constituting his "investment" in the partnership.
Installment payments are provided for, and in the event those payments are not made the partnership may be terminated. Of course,
there will usually be a recital that the liquor license has been contributed by the limited partner (whose money will in fact have been
used to purchase the license). If the partnership is terminated, ownership of the license vests in the limited partner. 8'
(1) Advantages.-Except perhaps in California84 and Kentucky,8s there is no legal impediment to such an arrangement The
limited partner must, of course, be approved by the state agency.
In addition to the usual registration of the limited partnership agreement,"6 the document may have to be shown to the state administrative agency, 87 and, for the protection of the financer, its existence
should be made known to that state agency.88 The rest is a matter
of partnership law, with nothing in the arrangement contrary to
ANN. § 23-902(e) (Supp. 1965); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, § 120(9) (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1965); IND. ANN. STAT. § 12-448(b) (1956); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 243.100 (4)
(1963); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 26:79(B) (1951); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 201
(1964); MIAH. STAT. ANN. § 18.994 (Supp. 1965); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 311.030 (1963);
MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 4-402(6) (1957); NEB. REV. STAT. § 53-103(12) (Supp.
1965); NEV. REV. STAT. § 369.080 (1959); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 181:3 (1964);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 33:1-1 (r) (Supp. 1965); N.M. STAT. ANN. 5 46-1-1 (1953); N.Y.
ALCO. BEV. CONTROL LAW § 3(22); N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-05-03(4) (1959); OHIO
REV. CODE § 4301.01 (B) (8); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
37, § 506(19) (Supp. 1966);
PA. STAT. ANN. tir. 47, § 1-102 (1952); VT. STAT. ANN. it. 7, § 2 (1959); WASH.
REV. CODE § 66.04.010(21) (1962); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 176.01 (13) (1961); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 12-2(1) (1957).

83 Part of a typical limited partnership agreement is reprinted in the Report of the
Subcommittee on Alcoholic Beverage Control to the 1959 Spedal Session of the California Legislature:
The limited partner has contributed the liquor license; the agreed value of
the license is $9,000; he is not required to make any further contribution to
the partnership; the license shall be returned to him upon the termination of
the partnership; he shall receive a guaranteed $200 per month; upon the termination of the partnership the license reverts to him; the general partners shall
pay all debts of the partnership; the general partners shall not use the license
to obtain any credit nor allow any liability to be placed against it. Subcommittee on Alcoholic Beverage Control, ABC in California (1953-55), Vol. 4,
No. 1, California Legislature, Special Sess. 69 (1959).
84
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 24076.
85
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 243.660 (1963).
86
UNiFORM LM&TED PARTNm -P AcT § 2 The hazards in failing to properly
register the limited partnership agreement are well known. A recent reminder is Vidricksen v. Grover, 363 F.2d 372 (9th Cir. 1966) holding the negligent party liable as a
general partner in bankruptcy proceedings. Id. at 373.
87 See authorities cited note 89 infra and notes 37-41 sapra concerning the requirements of full disclosure.
88 Ibid.
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public policy, provided that the state statute permits limited partnerships to hold liquor licenses and that all interested parties are of
record with the state - silent partners and other undisclosed interests are usually deemed violative of public policy. 9
(2) Disadvantages.-The limited partnership is obviously preferred so as to avoid the possible liability that a general partner
might incur. Unless there is some statutory limitation on the number of ownership interests in liquor licenses," the financer can do
business in this manner and protect his interests as against the general partners (the "true" licensees). But the limited partner, assuming he can get no other rights as a lienor of the license, will have to
"police" his security, the licensed business. For as against creditors
of the partnership and its trustees in bankruptcy, his interest is apt
to be subordinate, even though his interest will be prior to those of
the general partners upon dissolution and liquidation of the partnership assets. 9" Hence, the financing creditor as a limited partner
should, to the extent practical, try to prevent the creation of any major indebtedness and see to the payment of taxes and rent. The
limited partner is helped in this regard by the usual alcoholic beverages statutes which severely limit9 2 and sometimes entirely prohibit
89 See, e.g., Price v. Marcus, 199 Okla. 356, 185 P.2d 953 (1947) (and cases cited
therein). In Smith v. Nix, 206 Ga. 403, 57 S.E.2d 275 (1950), the executrix of an alleged silent partner was not able to maintain an action for receivership and an accounting of the partnership affairs. The court stated: "There can be no such thing ... as a
silent or dormant partner in the liquor business." Id. at 406, 57 S.E.2d at 278. See
Romano v. Bono, 168 Misc. 897, 6 N.Y.S.2d 204 (Sup. Ct. 1938). But see Romanus
v. Biggs, 214 S.C. 145, 51 S.E.2d 503 (1949) and the even more extreme decision in
Ex parte Rosenfeld, 214 S.C. 39, 51 S.E.2d 88 (1948).
90 See authorities cited note 1 supra. The Colorado statute makes it
unlawful for any person or corporation holding any license.., or any person
who is a stockholder of any corporation holding a license ... to be a stockholder or to be interested, directly or indirectly, in any banking, loaning, or
financing company, or any company of any kind whatsoever which company
shall make or own, or be interested, directly or indirectly, in any loan to any
licensee ... or for any [licensed] person or corporation ... to make any loan,
or be interested, directly or indirectly, in any loan to any other licensee ....
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 75-2-15(5) (1963).
Any agreement arising out of the prohibited transactions is made void and unenforceable. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 75-2-15(7) (1963).
91 See Klebanow v. New York Produce Exch., 344 F.2d 294, 297 (2d Cir. 1965).
92 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 561.42(2) (1963) (permitting credit for ten days
after the calendar week during which the sale was made); IND. ANN. STAT. § 12-530
(Supp. 1966) (allowing fifteen days credit after which "no wholesaler shall sell to any
such retailer except for cash on delivery"; WIs. STAT. ANN. § 176.01(23) (1961)
(permitting purchase by retail licensees on not more than thirty days credit). See generally Note, Illinois Liquor Control Act Credit Restrictions, 1 DEPAUL L. REV. 287
(1952) which briefly surveys the statutes in Illinois, Michigan, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut.
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purchases on credit by licensees 3 and which may even penalize
wholesalers and manufacturers who extend credit to the retail liquor
licensee."
B.

Corporationsas Liquor Licensees

(1) Avoidance of ProhibitionAgainst Pledges of the License.
-Where corporations may be licensees, 5 the impediment that the
liquor license itself cannot be pledged or given as security may be
overcome. The corporation can execute the various evidences of
the debt and, upon default, execution may be had upon all its valuable assets, including the liquor license. The means of execution
may vary from creditors' bills and supplemental proceedings with
the appointment of receivers, to direct execution by issuance of a
writ, or by levy and seizure of the license, depending upon the
applicable state law.
(2) Organization of the Corporation.-Thefinancing creditor
can sometimes take a pledge of the stock and reserve voting privileges to his nominees. He can then create a board of directors of
his own choosing and select enough directors and officers to protect
his interests." The registered office of the corporation may, if it
need not be at the principal place of business, be at the office of the
financing creditor. And, in addition, some administrative agencies
will, upon request, notify financing creditors, as parties in interest, of
9

3
See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. 5 41-702 (1964); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 244.040
(1) (1963); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 304 (1964); OHIo REV. CODE 5 4301.24
(Supp 1965); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 37, § 535(6) (Supp. 1966).
94
See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 12-530 (Supp. 1966).
95
Most of the regulatory statutes define persons eligible to hold licenses to include
corporations, or make special provision for corporate licensees. See ALA. CODE tit. 29, §
5 (1955); ALASKA STAT. § 35-4-14 (1958); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 4-202(b)
(Supp. 1965); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 23008; COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 75-2-4
(21) (1963); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.4, § 101 (1953); D.C. CODE ANN. § 25-103(m)
(1961); HAWAI REV. LAWS 5 159-1 (1955); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 23-902(e) (1948);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, § 120(10) (Smith-Hurd 1965); IND. ANN. STAT. § 12-448(b),
(1956); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 243.100(4) (1963); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 26:79(B)
(1950); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 28, § 201 (1964); MICE. STAT. ANN. § 18.972(11)
(1957); Mo. ANN. STAT. 5 311.030 (1965); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 4-402(6)
(1965); NEB. REV. STAT. 5 53-103(12) (Supp. 1965); NEV. REV. STAT. 5369.190
(2) (b) (1957); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 181:3 (1964); N.J. STAT. ANN. 5 33.1-1
(1937); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 46-1-1 (1953); N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONTROL LAw § 3(22);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-05-03(5) (1959); OHIO REv. CODE § 4301.01 (B) (8); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 37, § 506(19) (Supp. 1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 1-102 (1952);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 2 (1959); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 66.04.010 (21) (1961);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 176.01(13) (1961); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 12-2(1) (1957).
96 See Flomar Bar Corp., 201 Pa. Super. 25, 191 A.2d 912 (1963) wherein the financer also accepted the signed, undated resignation of the officers of the corporate licensee, merely having a majority of the directors during the term of the loan.
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any action or proceedings which the agencies may take regarding
the license.
If the statute or administrative regulations are realistic, little of
the foregoing will present serious problems of administration and
control or of public policy. Usually, all the directors or officers and
sometimes the major stockholders of the corporate liquor licensee
will be required to obtain the approval of the licensing agency,97
and ordinarily that would include pledgees of the stock as well.
Thus, public policy favoring full disclosure of all interested parties
has been implemented."
(3) Defalt.-In the event of default, the financing creditor's
nominees, as directors, can change the officers and replace the manager of the licensed business. He can sell the pledged stock, presumably in any commercially reasonable manner." Any of these
remedies as efforts at debt collection are usually subject to the approval of the state administrative agency; certainly the sale of the
license will be, even if that sale takes place indirectly by selling or
assigning the capital stock of the corporation in whose name the
license is issued.'0 0
One practical problem of administration arises in the approval
of the sale or transfer of a liquor license to a publicly held corporation, or to one with a large number of stockholders and officers. As
it does not seem worthwhile to investigate all those who in a small
or close corporation would be examined as regards their individual
suitability to hold a liquor license, a statutory exception is sometimes provided for corporations, the stock of which is publicly
traded or who must file reports with the Securities and Exchange
Commission.'
Thus, the California prohibition against pledging
the stock of a corporate licensee also excepts such corporations.'
97 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Price Bar, Inc., 203 Pa. Super. 481, 201 A.2d 221
(1964); Roxy Wines & Liquor Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority, 5 Misc. 2d
343, 159 N.Y.S.2d 926 (Sup. Ct. 1957). Cf. Flomar Bar Corp., supra note 96.
98 An action brought by the administratrix of the alleged secret owner of stock in a
corporate licensee was dismissed because the secret ownership of the decedent violated
the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law. Flegenheimer v. Brogan, 259 App. Div. 347, 30
N.E.2d 591, 19 N.Y.S.2d 343 (1940).
09 UCC 5 9-504.
300 see CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 24070. HAwAii REv. LAWS § 159-41 (Supp.
1961) prohibits changes without state approval of more than twenty-five percent of the
capital stock or lesser changes which give the transferee twenty-five percent or more of
the outstanding capital stock; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 26:79B (1950); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 138, 5 23 (1965); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 18.994 (Supp. 1965).
101 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 24070; MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 138, § 23 (1965);
N.M. STAT. ANN. 5 46-5-15G (Supp. 1965).
102 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 23405, 24070.
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Apart from the question of whether small and close corporations
are not being denied the equal protection of the laws, a financer can
presumably avoid the California statute by simply becoming a large
enough corporation. But again, as in financing by limited partnership, the creditor must pay rather dose attention to the conduct of
the licensed business, at least insofar as is necessary to avoid other
large debts which might have priority in the event of sale, either voluntarily or judicially, of the liquor license or of the entire licensed
business- This follows from the fact that, by hypothesis, no direct
lien or security interest can be had upon the liquor license itself;
hence, the financing creditor cannot by the conventional means were a liquor license not involved - gain a position of priority over
other creditors.
VI.

A.

EFFECTS OF LICENSEE'S BANKRUPTCY

Generally

If the individual or corporation is insolvent and has been adjudicated a bankrupt, the right of the trustee or receiver to sell the license as an asset of the bankrupt estate is rarely questioned. Some
statutes make specific provision for the sale of the liquor license and
for temporary operation of the licensed business by the trustee in
order to expedite his sale of the license pursuant to statutory authority.'
But even absent explicit statutory rights, section 70a of the
National Bankruptcy Act 0° was immediately interpreted as giving
the trustee the power to sell, even though the transferability of the
administrative body
liquor license depended upon the consent of 1an
05
which was not then a party to the proceedings.
There had been ample precedent for this interpretation in that
stock exchange seats were consistently held property which the bankrupt could by any means have transferred' within the meaning of
section 70a."°7 Such property could be ordered assigned to the
103 See ARI. RE.V. STAT. ANN. § 4-204A (1956); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§
24071, 23102; CoNN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 30-14 (1958); HAwAII REV. LAWS § 159-94
(Supp. 1961); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, § 119 (Smith-Hurd 1944); IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 12-502 (1956); KY. REV. STAT. ANN, § 243.640 (1963); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
26:75 (Supp. 1965); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 28, § 203.2 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 2B, § 74(a) (Supp. 1963); NEB. REV. STAT. § 53-149 (1960); NJ. STAT. ANN.
§ 33:1-26 (1965); TEX. REV. CODE ANN. art. 666-13(b) (1952); VA. CODE ANN.

tit. 4, § 59 (Supp. 1964).
104 30 Stat. 566 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1964).
105 Fisher v. Cushman, 103 Fed. 860 (1st Cit. 1900).
106 30 Stat. 566 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 110(a)(5) (1964).
107 Ibid.
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trustee from the holder or directly to the purchaser from the trustee.' °8 These decisions were interpreted as having firmly established
that if the asset was transferable by the bankrupt's sale for a valuable
consideration, then the bankruptcy court could order such a sale and
compel the bankrupt to sign the appropriate forms. The fact that a
liquor license is subject to the police powers of the states and, unlike
a stock exchange seat, is not a privately created right was not considered decisive."0 9 The liquor license, insofar as it had a transfer
value in excess of its annual renewal fee, was taken to represent
capital; as such it ought to be made available to the bankrupt's
creditors." 0 At the same time, another bankruptcy court had no
stated reservations about the sale of a liquor license by the trustee
and the application of the proceeds to the bankrupt's estate."' Since
that decision there has been almost no impediment to liquor licenses being taken as part of the bankrupt's estate and sold by the
trustee or receiver."'
Of course, the sale by the trustee is subject to the approval of the
appropriate licensing agency or, in some cases, to police approval,
since any proposed transferee must meet the same requirements as
the original licensee."' But by analogy to the stock exchange seat
cases, 1 4 a bankruptcy court presumably could compel the licensing
agency to accept a buyer as a licensee so long as he met the statutory
and administrative requirements; to the extent that such rules and
regulations unjustifiably prevented the transfer, the bankruptcy court
could probably declare them a nullity." 5
B.

Termination of License Upon Showing of Insolvency

Note that at least one statute provides for termination of the liquor license upon a showing of insolvency." 6 The result is that an
adjudication in bankruptcy destroys the very asset which would be
108 Sparhawk v. Yerkes, 142 U.S. 1 (1891); Hyde v. Woods, 94 U.S. 523 (1877).
109 Fisher v. Cushman, 103 Fed. 860, 863 (1st Cir. 1900).
110 Id. at 865.

III In re Myers, 102 Fed. 869 (E.D. Pa. 1900).
112 E.g., Tracy v. Ginzberg, 205 U.S. 170 (1907); In re Brewster-Raymond Co., 344
F.2d 903 (6th Cir. 1965); Citrigno v. Williams, 255 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1958); In re
Quaker Room, 90 F. Supp. 758 (S.D. Cal. 1950); In re Fuetl, 247 Fed. 829 (D. Conn.
1917); In re Johnson, 224 Fed. 180 (W.D. Wash. 1915).
113 See In re Fued, supra note 112, at 832. Most of the present regulatory statutes
have the same requirement.
14 Sparhawk v. Yerkes, 142 U.S. 1 (1891); Hyde v. Woods, 94 U.S. 523 (1877).
115 Cf. Londheim v. White, 67 How. Pr. 467, 471-73 (N.Y. City Ct. 1884).
116PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-468(b) (1952).
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sold for the benefit of the bankrupt's creditors."' Chapter XI proceedings,"' which do not necessarily evidence true insolvency but
merely the inability to pay debts as they mature," 9 do not result in
the loss of the license, and it may therefore be sold by the receiver,
trustee, or the debtor in possession. By definition of the problem,
except in those states which do allow liens or execution process on
licenses, 2 ' there will be no secured creditor to object as far as the
license is concerned. And, notwithstanding the admonition of the
cases interpreting section 313(2),1"1 the writer has seen several such

sales accomplished without untoward difficulty in Chapter XI proceedings.
VII.

A.

COMPETING FEDERAL TAx LIENS

Property v. Privilege

With the conspicuous exception of ParamoantFin. Co. v.S & C
Tavern, Inc.,'22 of which more needs to be said, the federal and state
courts appear to have uniformly construed the language of section
6321 of the Internal Revenue Code of 195423 as giving the federal
government the status and rights of a lien creditor of the delinquent
taxpayer from the date the taxpayer receives notice of the tax lien.'24
As against other lien creditors or secured parties, the tax lien is notice
to them as of the date of record filing" and takes its priority position at that time, 2 ' based on the federal common law rule so often

reiterated that it is now described as a cliche: 2 the first lien in time
is first in right. 28 Although there has been much dispute as to
117 In re Union Foods, Inc., 54 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Pa. 1944).
118.30 Star. 544 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-99 (1964).

119 See Paragraph 3 of Form 48, 11 U.S.C. 2048 (Appendix 1964).
120 See authorities dted note 44 supra.
121 National Bankruptcy Act § 313(2), added by 52 Stat. 906 (1938), 11 U.S.C.
5 713(2) (1964). See generally Annot., 24,A.LR2d 1214 (1952).
122 245 F. Supp. 766 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
123 The language is as follows: the federal tax lien "shall be a lien ... upon all property and rights to property." INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6321.
124 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6321 (formerly INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 3670,
53 Star. 448). Many of the case references are to this earlier enactment.
125 INT.REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6323 (formerly INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 3672,
53 Stat. 449).
126 Ibid.
127 United States v. Harris, 249 F. Supp. 221, 223 (W.D. La. 1966).
12 8

See United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 85 (1954); United States
v. Crest Fin. Co., 291 F.2d 1, 3 (7th Cir.), vacated and remanded, 368 U.S. 347 (1961).
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whether a liquor license consitutes property or a right to property,"'
and notwithstanding existing state law to the contrary,' liquor licenses have been subject to seizure and sale by the federal government, and the state courts passing on the question have upheld this
practice.'' Perhaps this inconsistency occurs because such matters
are removable to the federal courts 32 which make short shrift of
the privilege-property distinction as a barrier to the collection of
federal taxes.' 3
In most of the state court cases, the liquor license was questionable property for purposes of execution process by any private judgment creditor. The statutes, at least, were fairly explicit on that
point.3 4 However, the courts have generally granted motions for
the appointment of receivers in supplemental proceedings by judgment creditors, a procedure followed in United States v. Blackett,3 5
in which distribution of the sale proceeds as between the competing
private judgment creditor and the federal tax lien was finally determined by the federal courts.' 6
129 See Golden v. State, 133 Cal. App. 2d 640, 285 P.2d 49 (Dist. Ct. App. 1955);
Mollis v. Jiffy-Stitcher Co., 125 Cal. App. 2d 236, 270 P.2d 25 (Dist. Ct. App. 1954).
In Boss Co. v. Board of Comm'rs, 40 N.J. 379, 192 A.2d 584 (1963), the court ordered
sale to the transferee of the Internal Revenue Service although explicitly stating that liquor licenses in New Jersey are not subject to "lien, levy, attachment, execution, seizure
for debts or the like." Id. at 388, 192 A.2d 588.
130 State law is supposedly determinative of the question as to what is property. See
United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51, 55-57 (1954); United States v. Sullivan, 333 F.2d
100, 111 (3d Cit. 1964); United States v. American Nat'l Bank, 255 F.2d 504, 507 (5th
Cit. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 835 (1958); Note, Property Subject to the Federal
Tax Lien, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1485 (1964).
131 See cases cited note 129 supra.
132 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1964). See Hearingson H.R. 11256 and H.R. 11290 Before
the House Committee on Ways and Means, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1966).
133 Barr v. United States, 337 F.2d 693, 696 (6th Cit. 1964); Division of Labor Law
Enforcement v. United States, 301 F.2d 82, 84-85 (9th Cir. 1962); United States v.
Blackett, 220 F.2d 21 (9th Cir. 1955); Deitsch v. Board of Liquor License Comm'rs,
58-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 68334, 68336 (Baltimore Md. City Ct. 1958).
134 With reference to Deitsch v. Board of Liquor License Comm'rs, supra note 133,
MD. ANN. CODE art. 2B, § 72 (1957) provides that "licenses... shall not be regarded
as property or as conferring any property rights." With reference to Boss Co. v. Board of
Comm'rs, 40 N.J. 379 192 A.2d 584 (1953), see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 33:1-26 (Supp.
1958) and concerning Golden v. State, 133 Cal. App. 2d 640, 285 P.2d 49 (1955), see
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE S 24076 (Supp. 1965). However, in California, liquor licenses had been held not to be personal property for purposes of taxation by the state.
Roehm v. County of Orange, 32 Cal. 2d 280, 196 P.2d 550 (1948).
'35 220 F.2d 21 (9th Cit. 1955).
136 The later change in CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE 5 24076 prohibiting the pledging
or use of liquor licenses as security probably would not have made any difference, since
there appeared to be no agreement creating the debt between the judgment creditors and
the licensee that pledged the license for security in United States v. Blackert, 220 F.2d
21 (9th Cir. 1955).
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Confusion

There is consistency only in the results: the federal tax lien does
attach; the liquor license can be sold to create a fund. But whether
the lien attaches to the liquor license or to the proceeds of its sale and that does make a difference - does not seem finally determined. Moreover, as against what other liens the tax lien will have
priority is not answered by recourse to any general rule relating to
liquor licenses.'3 7
The state regulatory statutes seem to preclude any seller, lender,
or creditor from acquiring a lien under state law. And the federal
government is quite bold enough to argue that a liquor license is
property subject to execution sale for payment of tax liens (i.e., federal law applies) and at the same time argue that the license is not
property as to which a private creditor, chattel mortgagee, or secured
party can have any interest which will entitle him to invoke execution process and compete with the federal tax lien (i.e., state law applies). 138 Admittedly, private judgment creditors have not failed to
use the converse of that argument,'39 but one expects more consistency of the Commissioner.
C. Confusion Resolved?
The problem posed is not one of a state-created exemption which
cannot interfere with the right of the federal government to collect
taxes 4 ° but rather concerns which law will determine what is property, and for what purpose, and also relates to whether the competing parties have the right to invoke the law of their pleasure at the
moment of contest. The Ninth Circuit did seem to answer part of
that compound question, suggesting that if the liquor license was not
property under federal law and, therefore, not subject to the federal
137 Where a federal tax len is asserted, priorities between liens is a federal question.
United States v. Security Trust & Say. Bank, 340 U.S. 47 (1950). See Note, Federal
Prioritiesand Tax Liens, 63 COLUM. L REV. 1259 (1963).
138 Paramount Fin. Co. v. S & C Tavern, Inc., 245 F. Supp. 766, 769 (N.D. Ohio
1965).
139 In United States v. Blackett, 220 F.2d 21 (9th Cir. 1955), the judgment creditor
argued that the license was not property or a right to property subject to a federal tax
lien, but the creditor had presumably conceded it to be something of value, for purposes
of supplemental proceedings, as a result of which the license was sold for $1620. The
court took yet a third position, namely, that the government had not imposed its lien on
the liquor license "but upon the sale taking place" which constituted the right to property; the proceeds of the sale were then the property of the delinquent taxpayer and
subject to all valid liens, of which the first in priority was held by the federal government Id. at 23.
140 See generally Annot., 174 A.L.R. 1373, 1384-86 (1948).
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tax lien (as argued by the execution plaintiff in the supplemental
proceedings equivalent to a creditors' bill),141 then neither was it
property subject to execution process in the state courts.14 But several state appellate courts have refused to consider the license property subject to private execution process, while conceding its value as
property or a right to property subject to seizure and sale by the federal government."' Other state courts have merely held the license
not to be property, not having had the federal government as execution creditor in their courts. 44
Of course the federal government in seizing the liquor license is
asserting either that the license is property or a right to property or
that the proceeds of the sale constitute property. 45 In the usual case
the federal government asserts either or both depending upon its
priority and the nature and status of the competing liens.
However, faced squarely with the question of whether the federal government could seize and sell an Ohio liquor license, a federal
district court recently held that according to state law a license could
not be subject to any type of execution process to satisfy a debt quite ignoring the appointment of receivers in foreclosure in at least
three earlier-reported state cases. 4 ' Reciting the usual liturgy that
the license is a mere personal privilege, 47 the court concluded that
the liquor license was not property (nor presumably a right to property) within the meaning of section 6321 of the Internal Revenue
Code.148 Thus, the chattel mortgagee, with a broad recitation of
personal property covered by the mortgage, prevailed and was held
to have the only right to the fund created by the sale of the entire
business, including its tangible personal property and the liquor li1 49
cense.
141 United States v. Blackett, 220 F.2d 21, 23 (9th Cir. 1955).
142 Ibid.
143 See, e.g., Boss Co. v. Board of Comm'rs, 40 N.J. 379, 192 A.2d 584 (1963).
144 See, e.g., Abraham v. Fioramonte, 158 Ohio St. 213, 107 N.E.2d 321 (1952);

Papatheodoro v. Department of Liquor Control, 118 N.E.2d 713 (Ohio C.P. 1954).
145 These are the explicit limits of the statute, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6321.
146Allied Inv. Credit Corp. v. Stardust Lounge, Inc., 192 N.E.2d 801 (Ohio C.P.
1963). Cf. Little Shirley's, Inc. v. Board of Liquor Control, 120 Ohio App. 179, 201
N.E.2d 718 (1964); Rio Bar, Inc. v. State, 117 N.E.2d 522 (Ohio C.P. 1954).
147 Paramount Fin. Co. v. S & C Tavern, Inc., 245 F. Supp. 766, 768-69 (N.D. Ohio
1965).
148 Id. at 772.
149 While the Ohio courts have held that a liquor license could not be the subject of
a chattel mortgage and could not be levied upon, Abraham v. Fioramonte, 158 Ohio St.
213, 107 N.E.2d 321 (1952); Allied Inv. Credit Corp. v. Stardust Lounge, Inc., 192
N.E. 2d 801 (Ohio C.P. 1963), one would have thought the distinction between the
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The result of these decisions is that although there can be no
lien or security interest in the liquor license, a chattel mortgagee or
secured party as to the tangible personal property can compel full
execution process by a receivership and have the proceeds of the entire sale, including the liquor license and the tangible personal property, paid over to him. Perhaps, as the court indicated, the license
without the business is in fact valueless. It is also true that the
business without the license is of little value. 15The
synergism, how0
ever, does create an asset of considerable value.
Yet Ohio is not alone in this phantasy. California prohibits the
sale of the liquor license itself for a price in excess of six thousand
dollars,' 5 ' while the licensed businesses are in fact sold for prices
ranging up to at least forty thousand dollars.'
Either the value of
the tangible personal property and the cost of procuring or assigning
a lease are simply inflated to conform with the statutory mandate or
the seller of the liquor license must resort to unlawfully taking consideration much in excess of the six thousand dollar limitation.'
The federal government, however, seizes only the rights which
its delinquent taxpayer had, including the right to transfer the license to a designated person, if approved, and it takes the taxpayer's
rights subject to their alienation prior to the recording of the tax
lien. 5 " If the delinquent taxpayer has validly assigned the right to
the proceeds of sale, when and if that sale takes place, the rights of
the federal government may be diminished to that extent, for its
rights can rise no higher than those of the person whose property or
right to property is seized.' 5 5 Hence, if the delinquent taxpayer
could not, at the time the tax lien was recorded, have kept the proceeds of sale as against a secured party whose collateral consisted
levy and the execution process by means of receiverships was sufficiently idle to have
been easily finessed.

160 Together, the tangible personal property and the liquor license were sold for
$11,600 in Allied Inv. Credit Corp. v. Stardust Lounge, Inc., supra note 149.

151 CAL. Bus. & PROF.CODE § 24079.

152 ALcmAN & ALLEN, UNwEmSInr ECONOMICS 301 (1964), as cited in Barron,
Business and Professional Licensing-California,A Representative Example, 18 STAN. L.
REV. 640, 648 (1966). See the "Business Opportunities" section of the Sunday New
York Times which usually advertises taprooms for sale at prices up to $250,000, exclu-

sive of the real estate.

153 Barron, supranote 152, at 660. A similar practice existed under the prior statute.
See Comment, The State Board of Equalization and Liquor Control, 38 CALIF. L. REV.

875, 879-81 (1950).
154 United States v. Lester, 235 F. Supp. 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
25 5 See Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y of the United States v. United States, 331 F.2d 29
(1st Cir. 1964) in which it was stated: "[13n matters of substance the government's lien
cannot rise above the rights of the taxpayer." Id. at 33.
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solely of those proceeds, neither perhaps can the federal government
retain them as against the perfected security interest of a competing
creditor.
VIII.

POSSIBLE APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 9 OF
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

The privileges of a liquor licensee include not only the right to
conduct a certain kind of business but also - and most important
for creditors' purposes -

the exclusive right to choose his successor

as the next holder of the license. Although the right is qualified
in that the proposed assignee or transferee must be approved by the
state licensing agency,' 56 it is certainly a valuable right, one which,
without
more, has been held an asset subject to state inheritance
7
5

tax.1

In the usual course of buying and selling liquor licenses, the
holder will execute and file the applications for transfer pursuant to
an agreement of sale with the proposed transferee, who must then
see to his own approval by the state licensing agency. Of course,
upon the execution of the agreement of sale, there is a bilateral contract in existence, the assignment of which - including the right to
proceeds as collateral - presents no difficulties under the Uniform
Commercial Code' 58 or at common law.

59

More important than questions of collateral is the question of
whether a private lender can have a security interest in the proceeds
of the sale of a liquor license, even if he cannot have any kind of
lien on the license itself, 6 ' either because of a blanket prohibition, as
in California' 6' and Kentucky,' 62 or because the license is not property for that purpose under the state law.
156 See authorities cited note 100 supra.
157 Feitz Estate, 402 Pa. 437, 167 A.2d 504 (1961), holding that the value of the
statutory right to apply after death for the transfer of a restaurant liquor license owned
by a decedent at the time of his death is taxable for inheritance tax purposes. The court
felt that "to hold otherwise, is to ignore the practicalities of the situation and to substitute abstract theories for the realities of the market place." Id. at 445, 167 A.2d at 508.
158 UCC 5 9-105(c) provides that "Collateral" includes contract rights, and "Contract right" as defined in UCC § 9-106 includes the rights of the transferor to payment
not yet earned by performance.
159 Great Am. Indem. Co. v. Allied Freightways, Inc., 325 Mass. 568, 91 N.E.2d
823 (1950) (dealing with ICC Franchise).
160 UCC 5 9-306(3) seems to require that there be a perfected security interest in
the collateral in order that a security interest may be obtained in the proceeds.
161 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 24076.
62

1

Ky. REV. STAT. 5 243.660 (1963).
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General Impediments to Such Security

The impediment to a security interest in the proceeds of a sale
that no lien of a chattel mortgage or security interest can be created
in property not'then in existence " 3 - remains a problem in states
prohibiting the direct imposition of consensual liens upon liquor licenses."" Although financing statements covering the proceeds of
sale of a liquor license could be filed beforehand, 6 ' the security interest is probably not perfected until the collateral (the proceeds of
sale) comes into existence. Since the chattel mortgagee or secured
party is not apt to have a perfected lien until the sale takes place, his
right to the proceeds will be deemed to have been created immediately before the filing of a petition in bankruptcy and is, therefore,
subject to being set aside as a preferential transfer under section
6 0a(2) of the National Bankruptcy Act.'66 An analogous situation
exists in regard to rebates of liquor license fees where the assignment
of the license fee to be rebated, whether recorded or not, creates only
an equitable lien 6 which will be subordinate to the liens of judgment creditors instituting execution proceedings168 and may be set
aside as a preferential transfer by a trustee in bankruptcy.'69 The rebate of license fees not yet in existence may be indistinguishable in
principle from the situation in which the creditor attempts to obtain
a security interest in the proceeds of the sale of the liquor license
I 63 In the Matter of Farmers Fed'n Co-op., Inc., 242 F. Supp. 440 (W.DN.C. 1965).
164 See notes 46, 52 supra and accompanying text. Since statutes and case law label
the liquor license a privilege and and not property (see authorities cited notes 20-21 supra
and accompanying text), a consensual lien - and, to be consistent, any lien - is impossible.
165 n the Matter of United Thrift Stores, Inc., 242 F. Supp. 714 (D.N.J. 1965)
af'd, 363 F.2d 11 (3d Cir. 1966).
166 Cf. Matter of Ideal Mercantile Corp., 143 F. Supp. 810, 813-14 (S.D.N.Y.
1956), affd, 244 F.2d 828 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 856 (1957).
16 7 Alchar Realty Corp. v. Meredith Restaurant, 256 App. Div. 853, 854, 8 N.Y.S.
2d 733, 734 (1939).
168 City of New York v. Bedford Bar & Grill, Inc., 285 App. Div. 1202, 140 N.Y.S.
2d 762 (1955) (and cases cited therein), aff'd, 2 N.Y.2d 429, 141 NXE.2d 575, 161
N.Y.S.2d 575 (1957); Atlas Advertising Agency, Inc. v. Casa Cubana, Inc., 259 App.
Div. 951, 19 N.Y.S.2d 900 (1940). But cf. Capitol Distribs. Corp. v. 2131 Eighth Ave.,
Inc., 285 App. Div. 541, 139 N.Y.S.2d 117 (1955), af'd, 1 N.Y.2d 842, 135 N.E.2d
726, 153 N.Y.S.2d 222 (1956).
169 See In re Silver Cup Bar & Grill, Inc., 50 F. Supp. 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); Calligar, Subordination Agreements, 70 YALE L.J. 376, 396 (1961) (and cases cited
therein). Cf. In re Wechsler, 27 F. Supp. 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
The same result obtains where the competing claimants are the licensee's assignee
for benefit of creditors and a creditor who took a prior assignment of any monies
which might become due to the licensee if the license were terminated. The prior
assignee had only an equitable lien. In the Matter of Guarino, 285 App. Div. 1161,
140 N.Y.S.2d 370 (1955).
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where there is not yet a contract of sale in existence, to say nothing
of the proceeds of such an expected sale. But where there are no
third-party claimants, the equitable lien which attaches when the proceeds come into being will be good as between the parties.'"
A Security Interest Under Article 9

B.

Prior to any contract of sale and transfer, the license might be
termed a "general intangible" within the meaning of section 9-106
of the Uniform Commercial Code, and thus validly be the subject of
even though the license did not then represent
a security interest
any right to the payment of money upon any specific performance
so as to become an account, nor could it reasonably be categorized as
a contract right in the sense of some called-for performance, the completion of which would then create a right to the payment of money.
It appears that the drafters of article 9 intended the category of "general intangibles" to cover such similar valuables for purposes of comSome
mercial collateral as stock and commodity exchange seats.'
commentators suggest a classification of intangibles which do not directly involve the payment of money and do not arise under a conventional contract and that a subdivision into rights which cannot be
fully transferred without approval by some public authority is comprehended by section 9-106."7S Even if its validity is questionable as
against other creditors, nothing is lost by an attempt to obtain a se70

See Capitol Distribs. Corp. v. 2131 Eighth Ave., Inc., 285 App. Div. 541, 139
N.Y.S.2d 117 (1955), aff'd, 1 N.Y.2d 842, 135 N.E.2d 726, 153 N.Y.S.2d 222 (1956).
171 The right to create liens in franchises existed under the chattel mortgage acts.
Io re Rainbo Express, Inc., 179 F.2d I (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 981 (1950);
First Nat'l Bank v. Holliday, 47 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1931). Cf. Freiderick v. Dockery,
209 F.2d 677 (8th Cir. 1944) (the certificate of public convenience was not listed in
chattel mortgage; the court implies that had it been done, the chattel mortgagee would
have had a valid lien); In the Matter of Independent Truckers, Inc., 226 F. Supp. 440
(D. Neb. 1963) (failure to record assignment of certificate of public convenience
created a mete equitable lien not valid as against a trustee in bankruptcy). And it
appears that something closely resembling a security interest could be created by the assignment of rights in an agreement to sell ICC certificates of convenience and the proceeds which might come due to the assignor under the agreement. Great Am. Indem.
Co. v. Allied Freightways, Inc., 325 Mass. 568, 91 N.E.2d 823 (1950). However, in
the Allied case the creditor took an assignment of an existing contract right, the agreement to sell the certificate of convenience, and the state court held the assignee to be a
secured creditor in state receivership proceedings. The same factors obtain in these cases
as with liquor licenses: the value of the "collateral" is entirely dependent upon the approval of one not a party to the agreement creating the assignee's interest-the licensing or other administrative agency.
172 1 GILMoRE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 12.5, at 380
(1965).
1

3

17 COOGAN, HOGAN & VAGTS, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM

COMMERCIAL CODE § 21.02(3) (1964).
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curity interest. If the security interest is not perfectable or is perfected but empty under state law, the creditor is simply out of pocket
the filing fees. And if the liquor license is property or the right to
property in the federal courts, 74 such a security interest is apt to be
good as against a competing federal tax lien. 5
C. Effect of a Security Interest
The effect of a lien or security interest in the proceeds of sale is
something quite apart from the possible or at least prohibited control
exercised by the lender-creditor in other legal settings where he can
perhaps force a sale or compel certain business activities to protect
his interest and insure repayment. Here, presumably, the secured
party can do nothing but wait. Perhaps he cannot have execution
process in the direct conventional way, but as against other lienors
and especially the federal government - he may get priority in
the proceeds of sale whether voluntary or not. Also, the secured
party may, without violating the usual liquor license statute, be able
to bring about an execution sale of the license by supplemental proceedings on his judgment or by a creditor's bill and the appointment
of a receiver.""
D.

PriorityProblems

(1) Judgment Creditor.-There need be nothing to prevent
the judgment creditor from proceeding on his judgment against the
licensee by instituting an action to compel the sale of the license
which is not subject to a writ of execution at law and could not itself
be subject to a lien or be the collateral of the judgment creditor's
security interest.
The judgment creditor alleges in the usual manner of supplemental proceedings"'7 or in a creditor's bill, that the debtor has prop'74 Barr v. United States, 337 F.2d 693 (6th Cir. 1964); Division of Labor Law Enforcement v. United States, 301 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1963); United States v. Blackett, 220
F.2d 21 (9th Cir. 1955).
7
1 5 Cf. United States v. Blackett, supra note 174.
176 More often than not, receivers will be permitted to exercise all of the holder's
rights in the liquor license. See e.g., Rosenberg v. Borough Cordial Shop, Inc., 85 N.J.
Super. 294, 204 A.2d 607 (Super. Ct. 1964); Wolf v. Barstow, 38 So. 2d 689 (Fla.
1949); Rio Bar, Inc. v. State, 117 N.E.2d 522 (Ohio C.P. 1954); Little Shirley's, Inc.
v. Board of Liquor Control, 120 Ohio App. 179, 201 N.E.2d 718 (1964). Cf. Leney &
Sons, Ltd. v. Callingham & Thompson, 1 K.B. 79 (1907).
However, Mencsik v. Mencsik, 118 N.E.2d 182, 183 (Ohio Ct. App. 1952) held
that a liquor license was not property which could be reached in receivership proceedings.
177 E.g., N.Y. CXVIL PRACTICE LAW AND RuLrss § 5225 (c), which gives the court
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erty not subject to execution process at law and that the license is
saleable for a valuable consideration. He requests that a receiver be
appointed to arrange such sale and that the judgment debtor be
ordered to sign the appropriate transfer forms. Apart from any
questions of when the priority of the creditor, as moving party, commences,'78 that creditor, who also holds a perfected security interest
in the proceeds from the sale of the license - if it is possible to have
that - should have the rights of a lien creditor from the date of
perfection. Since by hypothesis no other creditor in such a jurisdiction can have a lien in the license or have execution at law on the
license, the secured party should have a valid and prior claim to the
proceeds, which would be good as against other creditors and claimants and might also be successfully asserted as against later federal
tax liens and trustees in bankruptcy.
(2) FederalTax Liens.-It is unlikely that the courts or the licensing agency will consider that a physical seizure of the actual license will give the execution creditor any rights in the privileges of
the licensee,' 79 nor will the purchaser at execution sale acquire the
statutory rights and privileges granted to licensees. Apart from
those statutes which render licenses immune or exempt from execution and attachment process,"' there is mixed authority as to whether
the piece of paper which is the license itself is subject to seizure under a writ of execution. 8 '
But as private creditors discover to their dismay, even though
they cannot direct the sheriff to levy upon and seize the liquor license because state law prohibits that practice, the Internal Revenue
authority to order that the judgment debtor execute and deliver any document necessary to effect payment or delivery to implement execution process. The Pennsylvania
rule of procedure, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 3118 (a) (1966), seems to have much the
same sufficient authority, perhaps even before any other effort at direct execution.
178 This usually begins upon the date of service. See United States v. Ruby Luggage Corp., 142 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Wickwire Spencer Steel Co. v. Kemkit
Scientific Corp., 292 N.Y. 139, 54 N.E.2d 336 (1944); Annot., 153 A.L.R. 208, 211
(1944).
179 Cf. In the Matter of Brewster-Raymond Co., 344 F.2d 903 (6th Cir. 1965);
Division of Labor Law Enforcement v. United States, 301 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1962).
180 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 30-14 (1961); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43,
§ 119 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1965); IOWA CODE ANN. § 123.27 (1958); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 41-326 (1964); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 33:1-1 (1937); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1213 (1957).
181 This was permitted in Rowe v. Colpoys, 137 F.2d 249 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
320 U.S. 783 (1943); Stallinger v. Goss, 121 Mont. 437, 193 P.2d 810 (1948);
Nelson v. Naranjo, 74 N.M. 502, 395 P.2d 228 (1964). It was not permitted in
McNelley v. Welz, 166 N.Y. 124, 59 N.E. 697 (1901); Walsh v. Walper, 3 Ont. L.R.
158 (1901).

1967]

FINANCING LIQUOR LICENSES

Service is not similarly inhibited; the United States Marshall will
seize the license which will then be offered to prospective purchasers
at auction sale.' 82 That is a considerable tactical advantage,' even
if the private judgment creditor can later make claim to the proceeds.
The sale may be completed and his interest wiped out before the
private creditor has any notice unless (1) the applicable statute requires public notice; 8 4 (2) the private creditor can place himself in
a class of interested parties such that he must be given notice;18 and
(3) the effect is mitigated because a lien or security interest in the
proceeds of the sale has been created in his favor.
But if the federal government gets a lien on the license and the
secured party has only an interest in the proceeds of the sale of the
license but prior in time to the federal tax lien, who will be paid
first from the proceeds of the sale? The equities of such a situation
seem to favor the private lender who, although he takes the risk of
there being no sale at all, has done all that can be done to perfect
his security interest in the proceeds. But unless the liquor license is
viewed as a "general intangible" which, because of the circumstances
and a prohibitory statute, cannot itself be the collateral, there may
not be a security interest in the proceeds good as against an actual
federal tax lien on the license itself.
(3) Bankruptcy.-Much the same considerations apply in the
bankruptcy cases. Where the licensee is insolvent and an adjudication of bankruptcy follows, the trustee has all the rights of the
°
licensee, including that of transfer for a valuable consideration8
(i.e., the proceeds of the sale). Again the question arises whether
the proceeds will be subject to the creditor's "secured" claim in the
182Division of Labor Law Enforcement v. United States, 301 F.2d 82 (9th Cit.
1962) states that "the sufficiency of a levy made by a federal officer under a statute of
the United States is a matter of federal law, not state law." Id. at 85. Division of
Labor Law Enforcement v. United States, supra, was then cited in Barr v. United States,
337 F.2d 693 (6th Cir. 1964), for the questionable proposition that the federal tax
lien on the liquor license, served on the Michigan Liquor Control Commission, was an
authorized method of levy on a liquor licensee. Id. at 696. Contra, Paramount Fin.
Co. v. S & C Tavern, Inc., 245 F. Supp. 766 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
83
1
Itis generally thought, however, that a liquor license is property subject to attachment and seizure only if local law provides a statutory procedure for such execution.
See Roehm v. County of Orange, 32 Cal. 2d 280, 285, 196 P.2d 550, 552 (1948), citing
Rowe v. Colpoys, 137 F.2d 249 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 783 (1943).
184 ABC table 16, at 106 indicates that thirty-two states require some public notice
of an original application. Ordinarily, a transfer application will have the same requirements.
185 See text accompanying note 96 supra.
188 Most of the states have explicit priorities for operation and sale by a trustee or
receiver.

See authorities cited note 103 supra.
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bankruptcy proceedings. It is more likely that such a claim will
be viewed as though the license were tangible personal property."81
IX.

CONCLUSION: THE SITUATION IS DAMNED
BY FAINT PRAISE

Although much of the foregoing may look like a guide for
lenders' counsel, it is also a suggestion that the realities of commerce
in liquor licenses be fully accepted. These "rights" or "privileges,"
but above all, businesses, are bought and sold in a market place, and
those purchases are financed - all at their true values. There
is no need for pontification and fictional statements by legislators
and judges. If some other licensed businesses are so personal in
nature that their licenses are not and should not be assignable and
the businesses not salable, that is not true of the taproom. A responsible party may be a better owner than bartender, and no special skill is needed to sell a drink of whiskey or pour a glass of
beer.
To the laity

-

as perhaps it should be to lawyers -

it is strange

that the existence of a remedy is requisite to achieve a meaningful
right, and the creation of procedural remedies by oblique legal devices is the necessary condition for the enforcement of those rights.
That should not be necessary.
The purposes of state regulation will not be hampered by an
acceptance of the retail liquor license as an item of commerce. The
true intent of the several state legislatures may be furthered by more
candor. That should include approval of the practice of financing
purchases of liquor licenses, instead of pretending that financing by
indirect and even questionable devices does not exist. Such arguments have met with generally sympathetic responses in the courts,
and even that kind of judicial legislation helps accommodate the
symbols of law to empirically based reality.
18 7 Cf. In re Wechsler, 27 F. Supp. 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).

